Sam Cattle on Ransomware →
Draft Executive Order - Strengthening U.S. Cyber Security and Capabilities →
DRAFT (Inclusive of errors, et cetera - Editor) HatTip
Executive Order - Strengthening U.S. Cyber Security and Capabilities
EXECUTIVE ORDER
STRENGTHENING U.S. CYBER SECURITY AND CAPABILITIES
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Policy.
It is the policy of the United States to defend and enhance the security of the Nation?s cyber infrastructure and capabilities. Free and secure use of cyberspace is essential to advancing US. national interests. The Internet is a vital national resource. Cyberspace must be an environment that fosters efficiency, innovation, communication, and economic prosperity without disruption, fraud, theft, or invasion of privacy. The United States is committed to: ensuring the long-term strength of the Nation in cyberspace; preserving the ability of the United States to decisively shape cyberspace relative to other international, state, and non-state actors; employing the full spectrum of our capabilities to defend US. interests in cyberspace; and identifying, disrupting, and defeating malicious cyber actors.
Sec. 3. Findings.
America?s civilian government institutions and critical infrastructure are currently vulnerable to attacks from both state and non-state actors. Criminals, terrorists, and state and non-state actors are engaging in continuous operations that impose signi?cant costs on the US. economy and signi?cantly harm vital national interests. These operations may disrupt or disable the functioning of important economic institutions and critical infrastructure, and may potentially cause physical effects that could result in signi?cant property damage and loss of life.
The cyber realm is undergoing constant, rapid change as a result of the pace of technological innovation, the explosive global growth in Internet use, the increasing interdependencies between the networks and the Operations of infrastructure and key economic institutions, and the continuously evolving nature of cyberattacks and attackers.
As a result of these changes, cyberSpace has emerged as a new domain of engagement, comparable in signi?cance to land, sea, air, and space, and its signi?cance will increase in the years ahead.
The Federal Government has a reSponsibility to defend America from cyberattacks that could threaten US. national interests or cause signi?cant damage to Americans? personal or economic security. That responsibility extends to protecting both privately and publicly operated critical networks and infrastructure. At the same time, the need for dynamism, ?exibility, and
innovation in cyber security demands that government exercise its responsibility in close cooperation with private sector entities.
The executive departments and agencies (agencies) tasked with protecting civilian government networks and critical infrastructure are not currently organized to act collectively/ collaboratively, tasked, or resourced, or provided with legal authority adequate to succeed in their missions.
- De?nitions. As used in this order:
The term ?critical infrastructure? means systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.
The term ?national security system? means any telecommunications or information system Operated by the Federal Government or any contractor on its behalf, the function, operation, or use of which?
involves intelligence activities;
(ii) involves activities related to national security;
involves command and control of military forces;
(iv) involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons system; or
is critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions (but does not include a system used for routine administrative and business applications, including payroll, finance, logistics, and personnel management applications).
Policy Coordination.
Policy coordination, guidance, diSpute resolution, and periodic in-progress reviews for the functions and programs described and assigned in this order shall be provided through the interagency process established in National Security Presidential Directive of January 21,
2017 (Organization of the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council), or any successor.
Q. Review of Cyber Vulnerabilities. Scope and Timing.
A review of the most critical U.S. cyber vulnerabilities (Vulnerabilities Review) shall commence immediately.
(ii) Within 60 days of the date of this order, initial recommendations for the protection of US. national security systems shall be submitted to the President through the Secretary of Defense.
Within 60 days of the date of this order, initial recommendations for the enhanced protection of the most critical civilian Federal Government, public, and private sector infrastructure, other than US. national security systems, shall be submitted to the President through the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(iv) The recommendations shall include steps to ensure that the responsible agencies are appropriately organized, tasked, and resourced, and provided with adequate legal authority necessary to ful?ll their missions.
Review Participants. The Secretary of Defense shall co?chair the Vulnerabilities Review with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.
(0) Operation ofthe Vulnerabilities Review. The Co-Chairs of the Vulnerabilities Review shall assemble all information in the possession of the Federal Government that pertains to the most urgent vulnerabilities to national security systems, the most urgent vulnerabilities to civilian Federal Government networks, and the most critical private sector infrastructure. All agencies shall comply with any request of the Co-Chairs to provide information in their possession or control pertaining to US. cyber vulnerabilities. The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism may seek further information relevant to the Vulnerabilities Review from any appropriate source.
Review of Cyber Adversaries. Scope and Timing.
A review of the principal U.S. cyber adversaries (Adversaries Review) shall commence immediately.
(ii) Within 60 days of the date of this order, a ?rst report on the identities, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of the principal U.S. cyber adversaries shall be submitted to the President through the Director of National Intelligence.
Review Pariiczpanis. The Director ofNational Intelligence shall co-chair the Adversaries Review with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense. the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.
(0) Operation ofthe Adversaries Review. The Co-Chairs of the Adversaries Review shall assemble all information in the possession of the Federal Government that pertains to the identities, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of US. cyber adversaries. All agencies shall comply with any request of the Co-Chairs to provide information in their possession or control pertaining to US. cyber adversaries. The Co~Chairs may seek further information relevant to the Adversaries Review from any appropriate source.
- US. Cyber Capabilities Review. Scope and Timing.
Based on the results of sections 5 and 6 of this order, a review of the relevant cyber capabilities of the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Security Agency (Capabilities Review) shall identify an initial set of capabilities needing improvement to adequately protect U.S. critical infrastructure.
(ii) The Capabilities Review?s recommendations shall include steps to ensure that the responsible agencies are appropriately organized, tasked, and resourced, and provided with adequate legal authority necessary to ful?ll their missions.
Participants. The Secretary of Defense shall co?chair the Capabilities Review, with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of the National Security Agency.
(0) Operation ofCapobz?lz?ries Review. The Co-Chairs of the Capabilities Review shall assemble all information in the possession of the Federal Government that pertains to relevant cyber capabilities of the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Security Agency. All agencies shall comply with any request of the Co? Chairs to provide information in their possession or control pertaining to US. cyber capabilities. The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of the National Security Agency may seek further information relevant to the Capabilities Review from any appropriate source.
Workforce DeveZopmenr Review. In order to ensure that the United States has a long-term
cyber capability advantage, the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Homeland Security shall also gather and review information from the Department of Education regarding computer
science, mathematics, and cyber security education from primary through higher education to understand the ?ll] scope of US. efforts to educate and train the workforce of the future. The Secretary of Defense shall make recommendations as he sees ?t in order to best position the US. educational system to maintain its competitive advantage into the future.
Sec. Private Sector Infrastructure Incentives Report.
Scope and Timing.
Preparation of a Report on options to incentivize private sector adeption of effective cyber security measures (Report) shall commence immediately.
(ii) Within 100 days of the date of this order, the Report recommending options shall be submitted to the President through the Secretary of Commerce.
Participants. The Secretary of Commerce shall co-chair the group preparing the Report, with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs. The Secretary of Commerce may also invite the Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Chair of the Federal Trade Commission to participate.
(0) Operation ofReport. The Co-Chairs of the group that prepared the Report shall review and expand on existing reports on economic and other incentives to: induce private sector owners and operators of the Nation?s critical infrastructure to maximize protective measures; invest in cyber enterprise risk management tools and services; and adopt best practices with respect to processes and technologies necessary for the increased sharing of and response to real-time cyber threat information. All agencies shall comply with any request of the Co-Chairs to identify those economic policies and incentives capable of accelerating investments in cyber security tools, services, and software. The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs may seek further information relevant to the Report from any appropriate source.
Sec. 2. General Provisions.
This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or any head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Of?ce of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(0) All actions taken pursuant to this order shall be consistent with requirements and authorities to protect intelligence and law enforcement sources and methods. Nothing in this order shall be interpreted to supersede measures established under authority of law to protect the security and
integrity of speci?c activities and associations that are in direct support of intelligence and law enforcement Operations.
This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its of?cers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
Fingered →
Relatively new fingerprinting techniques were brought to my attention last week (H/T), that (reportedly) focus on the identification of browser users and utilization across multiple application deployments. Enjoy.
NIST Publishes Cyber-Incident Recovery Guide →
Whom Done It →
In what wraps up to be a superbly crafted screed penned by Glenn Greenwald, laboring at The Intercept; in which, the Good Mr. Greewald details the perceived falsehoods swirling about the alleged Russian Intelligence Services hacks of the Burlington Vermont electrical generation utility. Today's Must Read.
Time to Implement Offensive Cybersecurity? →
The Christian Science Monitor's contributor David Brumley, PhD. pens a unique thought piece on why offensive cybersecurity is now requisite, and certainly needs a playbook...
David Brumley is the director of CyLab Security and Privacy Institute and the Bosch Distinguished Professor in Security and Privacy Technologies at Carnegie Mellon University. He's also chief executive officer of ForAllSecure. - via CSMonitor.com
Cyber Insecurity: Emerging Policy Tools in Cybersecurity →
This mornings' dive into Beltway views of Information and Cybersecurity Security was brought to my excruciatingly long (as opposed to short) attention span by a fellow member of theInternet Society - Joly MacFie (Joly is a member of the ISOC NY Chapter).
Panel participants are Jane Chong of the Hoover Institution and the National Security and Law Associate there, Joshua Corman - the Director of Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council, Robert Morgus - a Policy Analyst for Cybersecurity Initiative, New America thinktank and Sasha Romanosky - Policy Researcher at the RAND Corporation and Faculty Member at the Pardee School; with the Panel Moderator- Trey Herr, Fellow, Harvard Belfer Center and Non-Resident Cybersecurity Fellow, New America's Cybersecurity Initiative and the Editor, Cyber Insecurity: Navigating the Perils of the Next Information Age. All in all, a stellar panel, and an engaging video.
Enjoy.
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Twelve Years On →
Hacker News writer Mohit Kumar, regales us with the unfortunate and unsurprising news: A Twelve Year Old SSH Flaw comes back to bite the nascent and deeply flawed IoT industry. Read it and weep my friends, at the show that never ends...
Bad Relationship, Technical Debt →
Technical Debt, and it's consequences... Illuminated for us - mere mortals - by Chris Hockings - IBM Master Inventor. Todays' MustRead.
In the worst-case scenario, an enterprise continues to invest in platforms that are no longer sufficiently effective, resulting in more personnel delivering currency rather than capability. Security debt is a term that has been coined to describe application vulnerabilities that result from such laggardly behavior. - via by Chris Hockings writing at SecurityIntelligence
US to Train Iran in Nuclear Security Best Practice - Including Cybersecurity
Likely one of the more blatantly misguided stipulations in the corporeal abomination known as the 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action', lies a component of the agreement, in Annex III. Within the Civil Nuclear Cooperation area, and in Section D that apparently commits the United States of America to enter unilateral defense training (think cybersecurity folks) of the Islamic Republic of Iran against all others (in this case the all others would be defined as to the State of Israel):
'10. Co-operation in the form of training courses and workshops to strengthen Iran's ability to prevent, protect and respond to nuclear security threats to nuclear facilities and systems as well as to enable effective and sustainable nuclear security and physical protection systems;' - Joint Comprehensive Plan, Annex III, Civil Nuclear Cooperation, Section D, within Nuclear Safety, Safeguards and Security
Read This
And perhaps note what similarities exist between and betwixt this young 2nd LT at the United States Military Academy recently branched to the Cyber Command and your career... Absolutely outstanding. Via The Cyber Defense Review.
Title: 'An Emotional Response to Being One of the First Cadets to Branch Cyber.'
Author: 2LT Daniel Brown
Date: Jun 11, 2015
I have been asked multiple times what my emotions were the night I learned that I would be branching cyber. The night was like any other branch night at West Point with all of the First Class cadets anxiously awaiting their fate as army officers. The only difference with this branch night as opposed to the previous decades of them was the inclusion of the new branch, Cyber, to the list of possibilities. I knew going into this night that there were roughly forty to fifty cadets that were competing for Army Cyber slots. All of us had put in work through a selection process known as the Cyber Leader Development Program in which our talents, experiences and skills were assessed by a mentor. I thought my chances were decent because I had put hours into my application packet and had done everything I had been asked to do. I knew I would branch either Army Signal or Army Cyber. My grandpa had been an officer in the Army Signal Corps so I had a historical connection to Army Signal, but my hope and dream was to branch Army Cyber.
As the night progressed we were finally given our envelopes with our branch inside and the first thing every firstie did was feel the envelope to figure out what branch they had gotten. I can say with complete honesty that I had no idea what mine was. We then waved the envelopes above our heads, as per tradition, and awaited the order to open our branches. When the order came I ripped open the envelope and confirmed my hopes and dreams. I had branched Army Cyber. The moment was surreal and was shared with several of my classmates. Cadet Ames Evans, a fellow cyber cadet, told me that he was ecstatic as well and that it was one of the greatest days of his life. Cadet Braxton Musgrove informed me he was happy, but was not incredibly surprised. This lack of surprise was an emotion that was shared by several cyber cadets who were confident in their abilities. This demonstrates one aspect of branching cyber that differentiates it from the other branches. Not only do cadets have to be sufficient in all three pillars, but even more importantly, prospective cyber soldiers have to possess a certain set of skills that separates them from their peers. To branch cyber means that you are a member of a profession. The hours and time it takes to become proficient in the skills necessary to be an effective cyber officer set cyber soldiers apart. It could be compared to learning several foreign languages, proficiently; learning to think analytically as well as logically work through incredibly complicated problems that utilize everything from cryptographic algorithms to complicated arithmetic equations. I knew that night that I was joining the ranks of such soldiers, and that was what made it one of the greatest nights of my life.
NCCoE Releases NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide Targeting Health Records →
The National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NIST NCCoE) has released a new draft practice document entilted NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide, Special Publication 1800-1: "Securing Electronic Health Records on Mobile Devices".
Targeting health care records (stored electronically), these artifacts are well-crafted first-rate (but draft, after all) information security documents. Available in both sections and in full (a compressed file also containing a manifest, and a number of template files is noted later in this post).
The Comment Period is open until September 25, 2015 (inclusive). The NCCoE has committed to allowing comments to be submitted anonymously, will be make public those commentaroes after review. Submit comments online or via email to HIT_NCCoE@nist.gov.
Sections Available
(1) SP 1800-1a: Executive Summary (2) SP 1800-1b: Approach, Architecture, and Security Characteristics (3) SP 1800-1c: How-To Guide (4) SP 1800-1d: Standards and Controls Mapping (5) SP 1800-1e: Risk Assessment and Outcomes
Full Zip Document Archive
Mercatus Assessment Report Opens Federal Can o' Worms
The Mercatus Assessment Report illustrates the true nature of profound information security issues in both federal information and cybersecurity realms. Via George Mason University's Mercatus Center Eli Dourado (Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and director of its Technology Policy Program) and Andrea Castillo (Program Manager of the Technology Policy Program for the Mercatus Center at George Mason University) comes this tour de force assesment paper exposing the information security challenges in federal systems architecture. Today's Must Read It And Weep.