Information Security & Occasional Forays Into Adjacent Realms
Videography Credit: Irongeek (Adrian Crenshaw, et. al). Please visit Irongeek for additional videographer credits and important information. Enjoy!
Homage to Olga’s Dish of Doom
via Martin Giles, writing at the MIT Technology Review, comes word from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine of Looming Quantum Doom (currently scheduled within 20 years). Good News, eh?
'The experts who produced the report, which was released today, say widespread adoption of quantum-resistant cryptography “will be a long and difficult process” that “probably cannot be completed in less than 20 years.' - via Martin Giles, writing at the MIT Technology Review
Mark H. Kim, a contributing writer at Quanta Magazine illuminates a recent paper published at the IACR, and contributed by Daniel J. Bernstein, Nadia Heninger, Paul Lou and Luke Valenta, postulate in their paper 'Post-quantum RSA' that in fact, the RSA algorithm might very well not be broken by the use of a quantum computational devices when aprpriately manipulated.
'The authors of the paper estimate that attacking a terabyte-size key using Shor’s algorithm would require around 2100 operations on a quantum computer, an enormous number comparable to the total number of bacterial cells on Earth.' - via Mark H. Kim, writing at Quanta Magazine, and from his article 'Why Quantum Computers Might Not Break Cryptography
The paper's content abstract:
'Abstract. This paper proposes RSA parameters for which (1) key gen- eration, encryption, decryption, signing, and verification are feasible on today’s computers while (2) all known attacks are infeasible, even as- suming highly scalable quantum computers. As part of the performance analysis, this paper introduces a new algorithm to generate a batch of primes. As part of the attack analysis, this paper introduces a new quan- tum factorization algorithm that is often much faster than Shor’s algo- rithm and much faster than pre-quantum factorization algorithms. Initial pqRSA implementation results are provided.' Excerpt from Post-quantum RSA published via the IACR, and authored by Daniel J. Bernstein, Nadia Heninger, Paul Lou and Luke Valenta.